# Marudi, Mercury, and Silence: Questioning the Official Narratives on Mining in Deep South Rupununi
Deep in the rainforest of Guyana’s Region Nine, the Marudi Mountains have become the setting for two sharply conflicting stories. One, promoted by the Department of Public Information (DPI), is a story of progress: mining revenues funding schools, transparent village councils, and a model of regulated small‑scale extraction. The other, told through investigative journalism, international police operations, and even the internal documents of indigenous organisations, is a story of institutional failure, environmental crime, and the quiet presence of a convicted Brazilian fugitive.
Recent postings by the DPI, the South Rupununi District Council (SRDC), and what remains of the Rupununi Miners’ Association (RMA) present a picture of unity and responsible mining. But a close reading of public records, police reports, and statements from the very same indigenous leaders raises fundamental questions about transparency, governance, and who truly benefits from the gold extracted from Marudi.
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## The Gazette Cancellation: An Association That Legally Does Not Exist
The cornerstone of the DPI’s March 20, 2026 article was the claim that a Special Mining Permit issued to the Rupununi Miners’ Association (RMA) in 2021 had created a framework that “enhanced safety and compliance” by coordinating two major companies and 38 small miners under a single umbrella.
What the DPI did not mention is that **the RMA was legally dissolved nearly three years ago**.
On **May 6, 2023**, a notice published in the *Official Gazette of Guyana* formally cancelled the registration of the **Rupununi Miners Association Co-operative Society Ltd., Reg. No. 2187**. The cancellation was issued by the Chief Co-operatives Development Officer under **Section 38(1) of the Co-operative Societies Act (Chapter 88:01)** following an official inquiry into the society’s affairs. The order concluded that the cooperative “ought to be dissolved.”
Under Guyana’s cooperative law, cancellation means the organization **loses its legal status**. Once dissolved, it cannot legally conduct financial transactions, enter agreements, or represent members in commercial activities. The Special Mining Permit issued to the RMA was explicitly non‑transferable and required the cooperative to maintain an active legal structure.
Yet documents obtained by the Guyana Anti‑Corruption Network (GACN) show that **GGMC tribute payments tied to the dissolved association still appeared in transactions processed by the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (GGMC) in March 2024 and January 2025**. The Stabroek News reported that when questioned, Romel McKenzie, the current chairman of the RMA, acknowledged that the cooperative’s registration had been cancelled but said miners were told that operations could continue. “The Ministry of Labour cancelled the coop, but after the registration was cancelled the decision was that we continue to mine,” McKenzie said.
When asked whether they were operating under the same mining permit, McKenzie confirmed they were. The Stabroek News verified that there is **no record of another special mining permit on the Official Gazette for Mazao Hill since the cancellation of the RMA Cooperative registration**.
This contradiction has triggered serious concerns about regulatory oversight and vulnerability to financial crime. The GACN investigation posed the critical question: **How can an organization dissolved by government order in 2023 still appear in transactions tied to Guyana’s mining regulator in 2024 and 2025?**
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## The Convicted Fugitive: Rodrigo Cataratas and the SRDC’s Contradiction
The most glaring omission from the DPI’s March 20 article is any mention of **Rodrigo Martins de Mello**, known as Rodrigo Cataratas. On **February 2, 2026**, a Brazilian federal court sentenced Cataratas to **more than 22 years in prison** for leading a criminal organisation involved in illegal gold and cassiterite mining in the protected Yanomami Indigenous Territory. The court found him responsible for severe environmental degradation, mercury poisoning, and coordinating a network that relied on a private fleet of aircraft to supply remote mining camps. He was ordered to pay approximately **US$6.1 million in damages**.
Despite this conviction, Cataratas has been photographed in Guyana on multiple occasions. In 2023 and again in 2025, he was seen in meetings with Guyana’s Prime Minister, the Minister of Natural Resources, and GGMC officials. Photographs circulated widely on social media, prompting outrage among indigenous rights organisations and anti‑corruption watchdogs.
The **South Rupununi District Council (SRDC)** issued a statement on **March 7, 2026** attempting to distance itself from Cataratas. The statement declared: “Regarding Mr. Rodrigo Cataratas, the SRDC wishes to make it absolutely clear that it has no relationship or formal association with this individual. Mr. Cataratas was known to be an investor connected to activities in Marudi, and the Council had no prior knowledge that he was a convicted individual in Brazil until information began circulating publicly.”
But this claim is difficult to reconcile with documented evidence. **Cataratas attended an SRDC leadership meeting in Aishalton in 2025**—an event recorded in photographs that circulated widely on social media. The SRDC’s own statement acknowledged that following the revelations, a meeting with all Toshaos of the South Rupununi was convened on **February 7, 2026** to address the matter. That meeting occurred only after public exposure, not before.
Furthermore, the SRDC’s assertion that it had “no prior knowledge” of Cataratas’ criminal background is undermined by the geography of the mining operations themselves. To reach the Marudi mining area, **all equipment, supplies, and personnel must pass through two SRDC villages: Karaudarnau and Aishalton**. The Toshaos of these villages—Apollo Isaacs of Karaudarnau and Timothy Williams of Aishalton—are both quoted favorably in the DPI’s March 20 article. It strains credulity that heavy machinery, crushers, and Brazilian personnel could transit through these communities for years without village leaders inquiring about the identity and background of the principal foreign investor involved.
The Stabroek News investigation added another layer of accountability. Romel McKenzie, the RMA chairman, **admitted to purchasing the first jaw crusher from Rodrigo Cataratas under a payment plan that has since been fully repaid**. McKenzie defended the arrangement by saying that outside investment was necessary during the early stages of the project because many local miners lacked capital, and that Brazilians in Marudi were technical specialists assisting with equipment operations. “There is no Brazilian boss in Marudi,” he insisted.
Yet multiple sources from Marudi and South Rupununi have described the area as a “full Brazo community.” Miners who spoke with the Stabroek News on condition of anonymity described a culture of fear, alleging that they are treated inhumanely by Brazilians in the camps and often threatened with permanent expulsion for minor mistakes. One miner reported being forced to work seven days a week and harshly reprimanded for resting.
## The Air Bridge: Helicopters, Unmarked Aircraft, and the Question of Permission
The movement of Brazilian personnel and supplies into Marudi is not confined to the overland route through Karaudarnau and Aishalton. Investigative reporting has documented an extensive **airborne network** that operates with apparent impunity in Guyana’s airspace.
Brazilian authorities, as part of the criminal proceedings against Rodrigo Cataratas, **seized a number of aircraft from his network**. Among them was a helicopter bearing the registration **PR‑JVZ**, which has been spotted multiple times flying in and out of the Marudi area. Villagers and miners have reported the constant presence of helicopters and unmarked aircraft—small planes capable of landing on remote airstrips—moving supplies, equipment, and personnel into the mining camps.
The Brazilian Federal Court’s ruling against Cataratas noted that he managed a sophisticated operation that used **at least 23 aircraft** to transport miners, fuel, equipment, and illegally extracted ore, all while attempting to give the operation an appearance of legality. The court observed that Cataratas publicly “takes pride in calling himself a garimpeiro on his social media, despite the criminal context involved.”
The SRDC’s March 7 statement acknowledged receiving reports of “planes and helicopters landing in remote areas of the South Rupununi” and stated that for several weeks, efforts had been underway to locate any potential illegal airstrips. But the statement did not answer the central question: **Who has given these aircraft permission to fly in and out of Guyana?**
Under Guyanese law, all aircraft operating in the country’s airspace require clearance from the Guyana Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA). Foreign-registered aircraft must obtain diplomatic clearances, overflight permits, or landing permits depending on the nature of their operations. The persistent presence of Brazilian-registered and unmarked aircraft in the Marudi area suggests either that these clearances have been granted—raising questions about who authorized them and whether the applicants’ criminal backgrounds were known—or that the flights are operating entirely outside the regulatory framework, in which case the government has failed to enforce its own aviation laws.
The operation of these aircraft also has direct implications for gold smuggling. The same air routes that bring in fuel and supplies can be used to transport unrefined gold out of the mining area, bypassing the Guyana Gold Board’s declaration requirements. If aircraft are moving in and out without proper oversight, there is no way to account for the gold leaving the site.
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## Where Is the Gold Going? Production, Reporting, and the 20 Percent Gap
The scale of operations at Marudi raises an obvious question that the DPI’s article did not address: **If the mines are running 24 hours a day, seven days a week—as villagers and miners have reported—where is all that gold going, and to whom is it reported?**
The RMA’s own chairman, Romel McKenzie, claimed that between **$80 million and $100 million** circulates monthly through economic activity tied to the mining operations. That figure represents an extraordinary volume of commerce for a remote mining district. Yet the official declarations to the Guyana Gold Board tell a different story.
The SRDC’s March 16, 2026 stakeholder meeting minutes—circulated among indigenous organisations—record that the Guyana Gold Board acknowledged that while approximately **80 percent of gold production is captured** through official channels, the destination of the remaining **20 percent remains unclear**. That 20 percent represents a significant vulnerability: unaccounted gold can easily fuel money laundering, smuggling, and the financing of criminal networks.
For Marudi specifically, the gap between reported and actual production may be even larger. Miners who spoke with the Stabroek News described a system in which those with access to the best gravel—often those with connections to Brazilian investors—appear to benefit disproportionately. If gold is being extracted but not declared, it can be sold through informal networks, smuggled across the border, or flown out via the same unmarked aircraft that supply the camps.
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## Ramagem, Cataratas, and the Bolsonaro Network’s Infiltration of Guyana
The connection between Rodrigo Cataratas and Guyana extends beyond mining operations. A detailed investigation published by Guyana Anti Corruption Network (GACN) on February 26, 2026, documented how **Alexandre Ramagem**, a convicted Brazilian coup plotter and former head of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin), **escaped to the United States via Guyana in September 2025**—with the alleged assistance of Cataratas’s son.
Ramagem was convicted by the Brazilian Supreme Court for his role in a scheme to keep former President Jair Bolsonaro in power after his 2022 electoral defeat. His crimes include armed criminal organization, attempted violent abolition of the Democratic Rule of Law, and coup d’état. He was sentenced to **16 years in prison**.
According to Brazilian Federal Police investigations, Ramagem fled Brazil by crossing clandestinely from the state of Roraima into Guyana. By September 10, 2025, he had entered Guyana, and on September 11, he boarded a direct flight from Georgetown to Miami, Florida, reportedly using a diplomatic passport he had not surrendered despite court orders.
Crucially, **Celso Martins de Mello—Rodrigo Cataratas’s son, who was also convicted and sentenced to over 10 years in prison for his role in the Yanomami illegal mining operation—is under investigation by Brazilian authorities for allegedly assisting Ramagem in his escape**. This provides a direct operational link between Ramagem’s flight and the family at the heart of one of the Amazon’s largest illegal mining enterprises.
GACN investigation further revealed that Cataratas himself is now operating as a “mining businessman in Guyana,” confirming that the convicted leader of this criminal organization has established a physical presence in the country. Moreover, the investigation documented that a broader network of Bolsonaro allies—including individuals linked to massive financial crimes—is establishing a foothold in Guyana’s gold sector.
One such figure is **Glaidson Acácio dos Santos**, known as “Faraone dos Bitcoins,” who is currently imprisoned in Brazil for leading a massive financial pyramid scheme that defrauded investors of an estimated **R$38 billion (over US$7 billion)** . His wife, Mirelis Díaz Zerpa, a Venezuelan national, has been living in Guyana and is a key figure in operations using companies such as Gold Forest Mining Inc. and Remex Minerals Inc. to buy gold from small-scale miners and export it, effectively laundering money from illicit sources.
This network includes **José Estevão de Sousa Júnior**, a former federal deputy candidate for Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party in Roraima, who manages a mining cooperative in Guyana’s Region 8, and **Pastor Everaldo Dias Pereira**, president of the Social Christian Party (PSC), which was allied with Bolsonaro, who is under investigation in Brazil for allegedly acting as a frontman for the pyramid scheme.
GACN investigation concluded that this is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a broader strategy by individuals from Bolsonaro’s political sphere—many facing legal trouble in Brazil—to relocate their operations to Guyana, leveraging the country’s gold rush and perceived weak regulatory oversight to establish a new base for money laundering and illicit finance.
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## Institutional Failures: The GGMC’s Missing Audits and the 10 Percent Illusion
The DPI’s March 20 article praised the transparency of village council management of mining proceeds and asserted that “all mining activity strictly follows the regulations of the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission.” But the GGMC itself has come under sustained criticism from anti-corruption watchdogs.
Policy Forum Guyana (PFG), the country’s leading anti‑corruption organisation, has documented that the **GGMC has not submitted audited accounts to Parliament since 2016** and controls approximately **GYD 16.75 billion** in funds that should have been remitted to the Consolidated Fund. The 6th GYEITI Report (2024) flagged **GYD 1.88 billion in unexplained variances** and missing documentation for GYD 1.72 billion in payables.
PFG has described a “shadow system” in which politically connected gold magnates manipulate license thresholds to control vast acreage while small miners are forced into exploitative subleases. The Puruni mining dispute revealed the GGMC ignoring a magistrate’s ruling and showing “clear bias” toward powerful miners.
Meanwhile, the **10 percent community benefit** that the DPI celebrated as a model of transparency remains a source of frustration for village leaders. The SRDC’s own March 16 meeting minutes record that toshaos raised **serious concerns about the 10 percent community benefit** that was supposed to flow from mining agreements, and that the issue remained unresolved and marked as a priority for future discussion.
If the promised community benefits are not being consistently delivered, and if the GGMC cannot account for billions in revenues, the DPI’s portrayal of a transparent, community-driven mining operation collapses under scrutiny.
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## Operation Guyana Shield and the Transnational Crime Context
In December 2025, a coordinated law enforcement operation known as **Operation Guyana Shield** brought together police and military forces from Brazil, French Guiana, Guyana, and Suriname. The operation resulted in **198 arrests** for illegal gold mining and money laundering across the border region. In Guyana alone, authorities seized unrefined gold and **$590,000 in cash** from individuals linked to a major organised crime group associated with a top Guyanese gold exporting firm. Mercury cylinders valued at over $60,000 were discovered hidden inside solar panels—a smuggling technique used to evade detection.
INTERPOL Secretary General Valdecy Urquiza stated after the operation that illegal gold mining had become the “fastest‑growing revenue stream for organised crime groups” in Latin America. The operation revealed that the borderlands of southern Guyana have become a corridor for Brazilian criminal networks seeking fresh territory after increased enforcement in the Yanomami reserve.
The DPI’s March 20 article on mining in the Deep South Rupununi made no mention of Operation Guyana Shield, of cross‑border crime, or of the fact that the very area it celebrated has been identified by international authorities as a hub for illegal mining and money laundering.
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## The Questions That Remain Unanswered
The evidence gathered from official gazettes, investigative journalism, and the SRDC’s own statements raises a series of questions that the DPI, the Ministry of Natural Resources, and the GGMC have not addressed:
1. **Aviation:** Who authorized the flights of Brazilian‑registered and unmarked aircraft—including the helicopter PR‑JVZ—into the Marudi area? Were the operators subjected to any background checks, and if so, did those checks reveal the criminal convictions of individuals associated with the aircraft? If no authorizations were granted, why has the government failed to enforce its aviation laws?
2. **Gold accounting:** Given that miners and villagers describe 24‑hour operations and Romel McKenzie claims $80–100 million in monthly economic activity, how much gold is actually being extracted from Marudi? How much of that gold is declared to the Guyana Gold Board? Where is the undeclared gold going, and who is facilitating its movement out of the country?
3. **The Cataratas connection:** How did a Brazilian fugitive convicted of leading a criminal organization in the Yanomami territory—and sentenced to 22 years in prison—obtain meetings with Guyana’s Prime Minister, Minister of Natural Resources, and GGMC officials in 2023 and 2025? What due diligence was conducted before those meetings? Did any government official inquire into Cataratas’s legal status in Brazil?
4. **The SRDC’s knowledge:** How can the SRDC credibly claim it had “no prior knowledge” of Cataratas’s criminal background when he attended a leadership meeting in Aishalton in 2025, when his equipment transited through Karaudarnau and Aishalton for years, and when the RMA chairman publicly admitted to purchasing equipment from him?
5. **The dissolved cooperative:** How can the GGMC continue to process tribute payments in the name of a cooperative that was legally dissolved in 2023 and whose cancellation was published in the Official Gazette? Who is receiving those payments, and on what legal authority?
6. **The 10 percent community benefit:** Where are the funds that were supposed to flow to communities under the 2021 agreement? Why do SRDC meeting minutes show that toshaos consider this issue unresolved years later?
7. **The Bolsonaro network:** What is the government doing to ensure that individuals linked to Brazilian financial crimes—such as the pyramid scheme operators now active in Guyana’s gold sector—are not using the country as a money laundering haven?
8. **The missing audits:** Why has the GGMC not submitted audited accounts to Parliament since 2016, and what happened to the GYD 1.88 billion in unexplained variances flagged in the 2024 GYEITI Report?
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## Conclusion: Press Releases Versus Accountability
The DPI’s March 20, 2026 article reads as a public relations document designed to present a harmonious picture of mining in the Deep South Rupununi. It cites toshaos praising community benefits, teachers grateful for donations, and businesswomen enjoying increased trade. These individual stories may be true in isolation, but they obscure a larger context of institutional failure, criminal infiltration, and environmental risk.
The SRDC’s March 7 statement acknowledged gaps in its own oversight while still participating in the narrative that mining is a net benefit to the region. But that same statement cannot credibly claim ignorance of Cataratas’s identity when his equipment transited through SRDC villages, when he attended an SRDC leadership meeting in 2025, and when the RMA chairman publicly admitted to purchasing equipment from him.
The presence of a sophisticated air network—including helicopters and unmarked aircraft moving supplies and personnel—demonstrates that Marudi is not an isolated, small-scale mining operation but a well-capitalized enterprise with logistical capabilities that rival those of legitimate mining companies. Yet the government has offered no explanation of who authorized these flights or why aviation regulations are apparently not being enforced.
The Ramagem escape, documented by Brazilian authorities and GACN, places Marudi within a broader network of transnational crime and political corruption. A convicted Brazilian fugitive linked to Cataratas’s son used Guyana as an escape route; Cataratas himself is now operating in Guyana; and a network of Bolsonaro allies—including money launderers tied to a US$7 billion pyramid scheme—is establishing operations in the country’s gold sector. These are not peripheral issues; they go to the heart of whether Guyana’s mining industry is serving the national interest or becoming a haven for international criminals.
What is missing from all official postings is a willingness to confront the hard questions. The people of the Deep South Rupununi deserve answers—not polished press releases. Until those answers are provided, the official narratives about Marudi must be treated not as facts, but as what they appear to be: efforts to silence scrutiny while the gold flows and the questions multiply.
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**References**
– Department of Public Information, “Mining contributing to Deep South Rupununi village economies,” March 20, 2026.
– *Official Gazette of Guyana*, Notice cancelling registration of Rupununi Miners Association Co-operative Society Ltd., Reg. No. 2187, May 6, 2023.
– Guyana Anti-Corruption Network, “Money Laundering in Marudi Mountains: Rupununi Mining Association a Front for Illicit Gold Flows & Transnational Crime,” March 9, 2026.
– Guyana Anti-Corruption Network, “Convicted Brasillian Garimpeiros Get Guyana Presidential Blessings to Mine Gold on Indigenous Lands,” February 25, 2026.
– Guyana Anti-Corruption Network, “Jair Bolsonaro’s Criminal Network Has Infiltrated Guyana’s Government and Gold Industry,” February 26, 2026.
– South Rupununi District Council, “Statement on Marudi, Illegal Mining Concerns, and the Integrity of South Rupununi Leadership,” March 7, 2026.
– *Stabroek News*, “Mining ongoing at Marudi even though co-operative dissolved,” March 15, 2026.
– INTERPOL, “Operation Guyana Shield,” press release, December 2025.
– Brazilian Federal Court, *Sentença Criminal – Caso Yanomami* (Rodrigo Martins de Mello conviction), February 2, 2026.
– Brazilian Federal Police, Investigation into Alexandre Ramagem escape, September 2025 – February 2026.
– Policy Forum Guyana, “GGMC: The Shadow System,” 2025.
– Guyana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (GYEITI), 6th Report, 2024.
– *Kaieteur News*, “Brazilian fugitive in Guyana: Rodrigo Cataratas photographed with government ministers,” multiple dates 2023–2025.
– *HGPTV*, “Operation Guyana Shield nets 198 arrests in cross‑border crackdown,” December 2025.
– *HGPTV*, “WHO CLEARED CONVICTED MINER FOR GUYANA MEETINGS? MARUDI OPERATIONS UNDER SCRUTINY,” February 27, 2026.
– *Village Voice News*, “The Guest in the Boardroom: Why is a Convicted Felon Shaping Guyana’s Mining Future?” March 3, 2026.
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