Guyana Anti Corruption Network

**For Immediate Release**
**Guyana Anti-Corruption Network (GACN)**

The capsizing of the MV Barima off the Pomeroon coast on July 18, 2026, represents not merely a maritime tragedy but the catastrophic culmination of decades of procurement malpractice, deferred maintenance, and governance failures within Guyana’s transport sector. As the nation mourns, we demand full transparency and accountability.

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## I. THE TRAGEDY: WHAT WE KNOW

On the night of July 18, 2026, the MV Barima—an 87-year-old passenger and cargo ferry built in 1939—capsized near Iron Punt off the Pomeroon River en route from Georgetown to Port Kaituma. The vessel carried 116 passengers and 17 crew members, totaling 133 people aboard.

**Casualties and Rescue:**
– 67 persons confirmed rescued (41 men, 11 women, and 15 children)
– 66 persons remain listed as missing
– A massive search and rescue operation involving helicopters, planes, and fishing vessels is scanning a 1,000-square-mile area

**The Captain’s Drug Test:**
Minister Juan Edghill confirmed that the captain tested positive for cannabis—a fact he described as “criminal.” This raises urgent questions about crew fitness standards and oversight.

**Preliminary Cause (Minister’s Version):**
Minister Edghill has claimed that preliminary reports indicate a “big wave” caused the capsizing and that the vessel was operating within its licensed capacity. He denied claims that it could have capsized because it was overloaded with passengers or cargo, stating it “had to do with the tide.” He also stated there was **no mechanical failure**. The vessel was equipped with 250 life jackets, two rigid life rafts, and six inflatable life rafts.

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## II. SURVIVOR CONTRADICTS MINISTER: VESSEL WAS OVERLOADED

The GACN has obtained a firsthand account from **Donald Modeste**, a survivor of the MV Barima disaster, which directly contradicts the official narrative presented by Minister Edghill.

In an in-depth interview with **Kiskadee Watch**, Mr. Modeste stated unequivocally that **the vessel was overloaded** when it sank.

This testimony from a man who lived through the disaster cannot be dismissed. The Minister’s denial of overloading now stands in direct conflict with a survivor’s firsthand account. If the vessel was overloaded, this is not merely a tragedy—it is a crime. It means warnings were ignored, regulations were violated, and lives were sacrificed for expediency.

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## III. OPPOSITION LEADER AZZURDIN MOHAMMED RELEASES TENDER DOCUMENTS: VESSEL WAS UNSEAWORTHY

**Opposition Leader Azzurdin Mohammed** has released tender documents on his Facebook page that paint a damning picture of the MV Barima’s condition.

According to these documents, the vessel was **not seaworthy and posed a danger to everyone on board**. The vessel required “pages and pages of repairs” and was “taking in a lot of water.”

**Minister Edghill is fully aware of the state of MV Barima. NO MAINTENANCE WAS DONE.**

Which means that the boat should have been in the dry dock last night, not on the way to Kaituma.

### Hull and Structural Damage

The tender documents reveal extensive structural deficiencies requiring:
– Renewing approximately **10,000 kilograms** of deteriorated hull plating and frames
– Replacing another **3,000 kilograms** of deteriorated internal walls, plates, and frames
– Addressing serious corrosion throughout the vessel
– Remedying weakened structural strength

These conditions meant water was likely entering the vessel, reducing buoyancy and increasing the risk of flooding. The vessel’s structural integrity was compromised to the point where it should never have been carrying passengers.

### Cargo Hatch Problems

Repairs required included:
– Replacement of hatch beams
– Replacement of damaged hatch boards
– Cement work around cargo hatch areas
– Installation of a tarpaulin hatch cover

The concerns raised by these deficiencies are grave. Seawater could enter through damaged cargo hatches. Cargo movement could affect stability. Water entering the cargo hold creates a dangerous **”free surface effect,”** making the vessel less stable and more prone to capsizing.

### Sea Valves and Flooding Risk

The report points to repairs involving:
– Sea chest valves
– Valve boxes
– Suction boxes
– Overboard strainers

If even one of these components failed, water could flood the engine room, causing loss of power, flooding, severe listing, and eventual capsize. The fact that these critical components required repair suggests a significant risk of catastrophic flooding.

### Hull Thickness Testing

One repair item required **ultrasonic thickness testing of the hull**. This is highly significant because it suggests concerns that the steel hull may have become too thin from corrosion. The actual ultrasonic test report should be produced publicly to determine whether the hull had deteriorated beyond safe limits.

### Propulsion Problems

The repair list also includes work on:
– Propeller shaft supports
– Propellers
– Shafts
– Stern tubes
– Installation of two new turbochargers

Major work was needed on the propulsion system. Possible consequences if unresolved include reduced engine power, inability to manoeuvre, and inability to face heavy seas properly. The 2021 engine failure was a precursor to these ongoing propulsion problems.

### Steering Problems

Repair items included:
– Steering ram seals
– Rudder blades
– Rudder stocks

Steering problems could prevent the vessel from maintaining a safe heading into waves, increasing rolling or listing. In heavy seas, a vessel with compromised steering is a death trap.

### Fuel and Water Tanks

One item required cleaning several service tanks. Partially filled tanks can create a free surface effect, where liquid moves from side to side and reduces a vessel’s stability. Combined with the cargo hatch issues, this would have further compromised the vessel’s stability.

### Zinc Anodes

Replacement of zinc anodes is mentioned, supporting the conclusion that underwater corrosion had become significant. The vessel required extensive work to address corrosion throughout its structure.

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## IV. A PATTERN OF PROCUREMENT BREACHES AND FINANCIAL MALPRACTICE

The MV Barima’s history is intertwined with a disturbing pattern of procurement irregularities and financial mismanagement dating back decades, as documented repeatedly by the Auditor General.

### Systematic Understatement of Revenue

Audits at the Transport and Harbours Department for the period 2003 to 2007 revealed that the agency **understated its financial statements by some $1.7 billion**. The year-by-year breakdown demonstrates a consistent pattern:

– **2003:** Operating income reported as $597,085,616, but actual revenues received amounted to $639,230,699—an understatement of $43,951,903
– **2004:** Reported $332,184,018, actual revenues $639,961,080—understated by $307,777,062
– **2005:** Reported $362,838,137, actual revenues $658,376,505—understated by $295,538,368
– **2006:** Reported $488,020,905, actual revenues $805,221,361—understated by $317,200,456
– **2007:** Reported $718,051,088, actual revenues $830,433,355—understated by $112,382,247

The Audit Office further reported that daily revenue returns prepared and sent by outstations were not presented for audit verification, making it impossible to verify revenue collected at these locations.

### Payment Voucher Irregularities

The 2003 audit revealed severe deficiencies in payment processing at T&HD:

– Amounts totalling $156,416,799 were expended for administrative expenses, but the general ledger reflected only $154,502,247—a difference of $1,914,552
– Payment vouchers were not prepared to support all payments made
– Bills and receipts were not attached to vouchers; these were filed separately and in no particular order, preventing verification
– A “paid” stamp was not used to prevent duplication of payments
– Six instances totalling $438,824 were observed where acknowledgement of payee was not seen
– Two payments totalling $2,530,000 for computers and accessories showed no evidence of Tender Board procedures being adhered to, nor were the items included in the Department’s fixed assets

The 2007 audit found similar deficiencies, with payment vouchers lacking supporting bills and receipts, making it impossible to verify the completeness, accuracy, and validity of expenditure.

### Asset Mismanagement

The 2007 Auditor General’s Report identified serious asset management failures:

– Depreciation charges of $790,301,465 were based on assets that were **not properly valued by a qualified valuation officer**
– An amount of $98,875,000 was shown as Fixtures and Fittings, but the Fixed Assets schedule provided no listing of these items
– **No insurance coverage** was taken out on Fixed Assets by the Department
– Certificates of title showing ownership of buildings and vessels were not provided for audit verification

### Procurement Act Violations

The 2007 Auditor General’s Report revealed that T&HD **failed to observe the requirements of the Procurement Act** for its capital works. Specifically:

– Capital works on vessels were **not publicly advertised**
– **Blanket waivers** were obtained from the National Procurement and Tender Administration Board (NPTAB)
– This failure made it impossible to determine whether contracts were awarded at the **most competitive prices** or to the **best responsive bidder**

The following contracts involving T&HD vessels were cited as in breach:

– $15.8 million for MV Barima and Lady Northcote
– $26 million for reconditioning of MT Aruka
– $38 million for MB Sandaka
– $15.9 million for MB Baramanni
– $262 million for procurement of spares and services
– $15 million for rehabilitation of navigational beacons

The Audit Office further noted that T&HD **advanced full contract sums without the completion of works**, exposing the institution to “great financial risks, should contractors fail to perform at set standards or renege on arrangements”.

### The 2006 Audit Findings

The 2006 Auditor General’s Report confirmed that T&HD “continued to request, and was granted, blanket waivers to award contract selectively,” noting that selective tendering was done “without the requisite pre-qualification of contractors and the invitation of at least three contractors to bid for these contracts”.

### Decades of Audit Delinquency

The 2014 Auditor General’s Report revealed that T&HD audits remained **as many as seven years adrift**, with the department consistently failing to submit financial statements for timely audit. By 2023, while T&HD had submitted financial statements for 2012-2023, its last audited statements remained stuck at 2011, with the last year laid in the National Assembly being 2010.

The 2023 Auditor General’s Report also noted that the Ministry released **$4.859 billion in capital subventions** to T&HD, yet the department’s continued audit delinquency means billions in public funds remain unaccounted for.

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## V. THE LEGUAN STELLING SCANDAL: A CASE STUDY IN CORRUPT CONTRACTING

The depth of corruption within T&HD is perhaps best illustrated by the Leguan Ferry Stelling project—a $413 million contract signed on September 20, 2018 under the David Granger administration.

Minister Edghill himself, in terminating the contract on February 18, 2021, described the arrangement as “a corrupt transaction”. The Auditor General’s special report revealed:

– The contractor received payments totalling $199,435,000—**almost 50% of the contract sum**—while actual works and materials on site were estimated at just $100 million
– An advance payment was made on September 26, 2018, but the contractor only received the order to commence works on December 6, 2018—meaning the contractor held tens of millions of taxpayer dollars for almost three months before being required to begin work
– The contract should have been completed by June 7, 2019, but was 20 months overdue by the time of termination
– By April 19, 2019, both the advance payment bond and performance bonds had expired
– The contractor claimed a faulty bill of quantities and received an additional $20,650,000 for piles—a critical component that should have been included in the original contract
– The Auditor General found no measured works breakdown attached to payment certificates, and variations could not be measured or quantified since no documents were available
– Payments made in some instances were **in breach of the Fiscal Management and Accountability Act**

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## VI. A HISTORY OF REACTIVE, EXPENSIVE REPAIRS

The MV Barima was subjected to repeated, costly emergency repairs rather than systematic maintenance or replacement:

**1996–1997:** Major rehabilitation as part of a G$245 million program shared with MV Northcote.

**2005:** Docking and repairs costing G$64.3 million. Auditors could not verify completion of the work.

**2015–2017:** Major rehabilitation costing $150.6 million. Work included hull repairs, replacement of propellers and rudders, installation of two new main engines, painting, new passenger seats, upgraded crew cabins, and addition of 250 new life jackets and fire extinguishers. The vessel recommenced service in April 2017 with travel time reduced by as much as 50%.

**2021:** Port main engine failure. The vessel had gone “almost four years” without critical maintenance since its 2017 refit. It was placed in dry dock for repairs and an engine overhaul after essential parts were imported.

**2022:** Emergency rehabilitation costing $90 million. Government inspection found the vessel in a “deplorable condition” with “severely compromised” systems. Repairs included structural rehabilitation of the hull (steel renewal, corrosion repairs), emergency mechanical repairs, and engine work.

**2024:** Underwater repairs. All underwater works were completed, with sandblasting and painting remaining.

**2026 (March):** Planned docking and rehabilitation with an engineer’s estimate of $124.5 million. Bids were invited, but the tragedy occurred before the work was completed.

**Total documented spending on repairs: Over $450 million since 2015 alone**, with significant additional sums spent earlier.

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## VII. THE FAILED PROMISE OF REPLACEMENT

For over a decade, government officials have acknowledged the vessel’s age and promised replacement:
– **2010:** Port Kaituma residents called for a newer, faster vessel
– **2015:** Cabinet Secretary Joseph Harmon stated ageing vessels “should not remain in service much longer”
– **2023:** The MV Ma Lisha was commissioned at US$12.7 million, with Minister Edghill stating it would “replace the MV Barima and MV Kimbia”
– **2025:** Another ferry, the Kalliopi N, was acquired

**Yet the MV Barima remained in service.**

In 2025, the government retired the 47-year-old Demerara Harbour Bridge, citing the need to replace ageing infrastructure—**but the 87-year-old MV Barima continued transporting passengers**.

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## VIII. MECHANICAL PROBLEMS DOCUMENTED OVER THE YEARS

Confirmed issues include:
– **Engine failures:** Port main engine failure (2021)
– **Aging machinery:** Government repeatedly described deteriorated systems, compromised mechanical systems, and aging equipment
– **Hull deterioration:** Multiple references to underwater work, structural repairs, rehabilitation, and steel renewal
– **Corrosion:** Repeated dry dock work suggests continuing corrosion issues expected for a steel vessel of this age

Government statements repeatedly noted that the vessel is one of Guyana’s oldest operating ferries, service interruptions significantly affect Region One, and repairs have often been reactive rather than part of scheduled replacement.

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## IX. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION CONCERNS

A 2018 International Maritime Organization (IMO) audit of Guyana’s maritime sector identified multiple shortcomings, including insufficient technical and legal personnel, the absence of effective implementation mechanisms for maritime conventions, gaps in safety communications, and reliance on what was described as an “archaic management system”. These systemic failures created an environment where an 87-year-old vessel could continue operating without adequate oversight.

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## X. KEY QUESTIONS DEMANDING ANSWERS

We call for immediate public disclosure of:

**Maintenance and Inspection Records:**
– Complete maintenance history of the MV Barima
– Frequency and results of scheduled inspections
– Whether recommendations from previous repair work were fully implemented
– When the vessel was last independently certified seaworthy

**Overloading Allegations:**
– Why Donald Modeste’s testimony contradicts the Minister’s version
– Complete, unredacted manifest for the ill-fated voyage
– Vessel’s certified cargo and passenger capacities per manufacturer specifications
– Loading procedures and who was responsible for verifying the load
– Any previous incidents or complaints related to overloading

**2024 Repairs:**
– Precise nature of work undertaken
– Whether repairs addressed structural or mechanical deficiencies
– Whether the vessel was independently certified seaworthy afterwards

**Crew Qualifications:**
– Training and certification records of captain, chief engineer, and loading personnel
– Drug testing policies and enforcement history
– Whether the captain’s positive drug test was an isolated incident

**Procurement Scrutiny:**
– Why $124.5 million was allocated for further repairs to an 87-year-old vessel
– Whether tender processes complied with the Procurement Act
– Why replacement vessels acquired failed to actually replace the MV Barima
– Why the 2007 Auditor General’s findings were never fully addressed
– How the $1.7 billion revenue understatement went undetected and unpunished
– Why T&HD audits remain years overdue despite billions in public funds being disbursed

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## XI. GACN RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Independent Commission of Inquiry** with full investigatory powers and public hearings

2. **Release of all maintenance records** for the MV Barima and all government-operated vessels

3. **Forensic audit** of all T&HD vessel maintenance and procurement spending since 2000, with particular focus on the $1.7 billion revenue understatement and contract irregularities

4. **Suspension of all passenger operations** for vessels exceeding 50 years of service pending independent seaworthiness certification

5. **Urgent procurement of a modern replacement vessel** for the North West District route

6. **Criminal investigation** into whether negligence—including potential overloading—contributed to the disaster

7. **Immediate drug testing** of all captains and senior crew members

8. **Independent verification** of the vessel’s load on the night of the disaster

9. **Public release of the complete manifest** to verify passenger and cargo counts

10. **Prosecution of any officials** found to have violated procurement or safety regulations, including those responsible for the Leguan Stelling contract irregularities

11. **Immediate compliance with audit requirements**, with sanctions for continued delinquency

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## XII. CONCLUSION

The MV Barima disaster was not an act of nature—it was a failure of governance. For decades, our public officials knew this vessel was ageing, acknowledged it needed replacement, and yet continued to pour millions into emergency repairs while failing to maintain proper procurement procedures or safety oversight.

The tender documents released by Opposition Leader Azzurdin Mohammed on his Facebook page reveal the full extent of the vessel’s unseaworthiness: **10,000 kilograms of deteriorated hull plating**, corroded sea valves that could cause catastrophic flooding, compromised steering, damaged cargo hatches creating a free surface effect, and propulsion problems that would prevent the vessel from facing heavy seas properly. These were not minor maintenance items—they were critical safety issues that should have prevented the vessel from ever carrying passengers.

The Auditor General’s reports paint a damning picture: **$1.7 billion in understated revenue**, procurement violations dating back to at least 2007, payment vouchers without supporting documents, assets uninsured and unverified, and audits years overdue. The Leguan Stelling scandal demonstrates that these were not isolated incidents but part of a systemic pattern of financial malpractice and corrupt contracting at T&HD.

Now, we have a survivor—**Donald Modeste**—who has come forward to say the vessel was **overloaded**. This directly contradicts the Minister’s version of events.

**Now is not the time for crocodile tears**—now is the time for facts, transparency, and accountability.

The Guyanese people demand to know:
– **Could this tragedy have been prevented?**
– **Was the vessel overloaded?**
– **Why was the 87-year-old MV Barima still in service with documented structural failures?**
– **Where did the millions spent on repairs go?**
– **Who is responsible?**
– **Why has the Auditor General’s findings been ignored for decades?**

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## REFERENCES

**Auditor General’s Reports:**
– Report of the Auditor General for 2007, documenting Procurement Act violations and advancement of full contract sums without completion of works
– Report of the Auditor General for 2005, documenting G$64.3 million in unverified repairs
– Report of the Auditor General for 2006, documenting blanket waivers for selective tendering
– Report of the Auditor General for 2007, documenting $1.7 billion revenue understatement and payment voucher irregularities
– Report of the Auditor General for 2014, documenting T&HD audits seven years adrift
– Report of the Auditor General for 2023, documenting T&HD’s ongoing audit delinquency and $4.859 billion capital subvention
– Special Report on Leguan Ferry Stelling Rehabilitation, cited in Minister Edghill’s termination statement

**News Reports on the Disaster:**
– BBC News: “Ferry carrying 116 passengers sinks off Guyana coast, authorities say” (July 18, 2026)
– Republic World: “Guyana Ferry Disaster: Boat Capsizes Off Guyana Coast With 133 On Board” (July 19, 2026)
– Arkansas Democrat Gazette: “A ferry carrying 133 people capsizes off Guyana’s coast” (July 19, 2026)
– Village Voice News: “Government press conference on MV Barima yields no new information, critics say” (July 19, 2026)
– Guyana Chronicle: “Cabinet continues to execute national response to MV Barima incident- President Ali” (July 19, 2026)

**Tender Documents and Procurement:**
– Kaieteur News: “Public Works Min. seeking contractors to rehabilitate MV Lisha, Barima & Hercules” (March 5, 2026)
– Guyana Standard: “Over $440M to be spent on major ferry repairs” (March 10, 2026)
– Kaieteur News: “Five companies bid to rehabilitate MV Lisha, Barima, & Hercules” (April 22, 2026)

**Survivor Testimony:**
– Kiskadee Watch interview with Donald Modeste (July 20, 2026)

**International Oversight:**
– International Maritime Organization Audit of Guyana (2018), as cited in Budget 2026 debate

**Opposition Documents:**
– Tender documents released by Opposition Leader Azzurdin Mohammed via his Facebook page, detailing hull repairs, sea valve replacements, cargo hatch problems, ultrasonic thickness testing requirements, and propulsion system repairs

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**CONTACT:**
Guyana Anti-Corruption Network (GACN)
[Contact information]

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*End of Release*