Guyana Anti Corruption Network

Armed and Unanswered: How a Convicted Brazilian Criminal Carries Military-Grade Weapons Openly in Guyana

Rodrigo Martins de Mello—known as Rodrigo Cataratas—is not in prison. Despite being sentenced in absentia by a Brazilian federal court to 22 years and 7 months for leading a criminal organization that devastated the Yanomami Indigenous Territory, he is living openly in Guyana. He has been photographed at meetings with Guyana’s Prime Minister and Minister of Natural Resources. He has been seen at mining camps in the Marudi Mountains. And on multiple occasions, according to miners, villagers, and sources with direct knowledge of the operations, he and his associates have been observed carrying military-grade semi-automatic weapons within Guyana’s territory.

The question before the Guyana Anti-Corruption Network—and one that demands an urgent response from the Guyana Police Force, the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Office of the Prime Minister—is simple: Who gave him permission?

Under Guyana’s Firearms Act, possession of semi-automatic weapons is strictly controlled. Licenses for such weapons are rarely issued and require rigorous background checks, justification of need, and approval by the Commissioner of Police. Foreign nationals are not routinely granted licenses to carry military-grade firearms, particularly those with outstanding international arrest warrants and convictions for organized crime.

Yet Cataratas, a convicted fugitive, moves freely in Guyana. His presence alone is an affront to the rule of law. His armed security detail—if that is what it is—represents something far more dangerous: the normalization of transnational criminal networks operating with apparent state tolerance.

Miners and villagers who spoke with investigators describe armed Brazilian men as a common sight at Marudi. Their weapons are not hunting rifles or basic handguns, but high-capacity semi-automatic rifles of the type typically associated with private security contractors—and, in Brazil, with the garimpo (illegal mining) armed groups that terrorized the Yanomami. Cataratas himself has been seen with such weapons on numerous occasions, witnesses report.

The presence of these weapons raises a cascade of urgent questions:

· Has Rodrigo Cataratas been issued a firearm license in Guyana? If so, who authorized it, and was his 22-year criminal conviction in Brazil—for leading a criminal organization, environmental crimes, and money laundering—disclosed or investigated before the license was granted?
· If he has not been issued a license, why is the Guyana Police Force failing to enforce the Firearms Act against a convicted foreign criminal living openly in the country?
· Who else in his network is carrying weapons? Are other Brazilian nationals with criminal backgrounds in Brazil similarly armed on Guyanese soil?
· How are these weapons entering the country? Are they arriving through the same unmarked aircraft and helicopters—including the PR-JVZ helicopter—that have been documented supplying the Marudi operations? If so, who is inspecting those flights?
· What risk do these armed groups pose to Indigenous villagers? The SRDC has expressed concern about illegal airstrips and social disruption, but has said nothing about armed foreign nationals operating with impunity in the South Rupununi. Toshaos in Karaudarnau and Aishalton—villages through which all Marudi-bound traffic must pass—have not explained why armed men linked to a convicted criminal are moving through their communities without objection.

The government’s silence is particularly alarming given the broader context. Cataratas is not merely a fugitive; he is the leader of a network that Brazilian authorities have documented as employing armed violence, environmental destruction, and corruption. His son is under investigation for assisting the escape of Alexandre Ramagem, a convicted Brazilian coup plotter who fled to the United States via Guyana. The same networks now operating in Guyana’s gold sector have demonstrated their capacity for sophisticated criminal logistics, including the movement of weapons across borders.

If a convicted Brazilian criminal can live openly in Guyana, carry military-grade weapons, and conduct business with apparent impunity, the implications extend far beyond Marudi. It suggests a wholesale failure of firearm regulation, border security, and the vetting of foreign actors in Guyana’s most strategic industry. It raises the question of whether Guyana has become not merely a transit point, but a safe haven for organized crime figures fleeing justice elsewhere.

The Guyana Anti-Corruption Network calls on the Commissioner of Police, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the Prime Minister’s Office to provide an immediate accounting:

1. Has Rodrigo Cataratas been issued a firearm license in Guyana? If yes, on what date, by whom, and what background checks were conducted?
2. If he has not been issued a license, why has no action been taken against a convicted foreign criminal openly carrying military-grade weapons in Guyana?
3. How many semi-automatic weapons licenses have been issued to Brazilian nationals operating in the Marudi mining district? What background checks were conducted on each licensee?
4. What steps are being taken to disarm foreign nationals carrying unlicensed military-grade weapons in Guyana’s interior?
5. Who is responsible for monitoring compliance with the Firearms Act in remote mining districts, and why has enforcement apparently been absent at Marudi?

The sight of a convicted criminal with military-grade weapons on Guyanese soil is not a matter of administrative oversight. It is a direct threat to the sovereignty, security, and safety of Guyanese citizens, particularly Indigenous communities in the South Rupununi. The government’s failure to answer these questions is, in itself, an answer.